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Involvement, Inbetweenness and Abstract Painting 
 
To come to an awareness of painting in the period after abstraction – by 
which I mean after the emergence and development of abstract painting – is 
to contend, to a greater or lesser degree, with the idea, language and look 
of a large assortment of painted objects from the past hundred or so years; 
dissimilar in form and content. The figurative painter Paul Winstanley goes 
further, stating that: “It is […] impossible to make paintings of any sort now 
without an internalized vocabulary of twentieth-century abstraction (2018: 
13)”. For him, this is especially apparent in the manner of painting’s 
particular pictorial arrangements – in the ordering of space – but also in a 
call to its own condition as object (in respect of its surface/image or 
object/edge). Together, to Winstanley, these elements serve to: “heighten 
the metaphysical nature of the painting surface as a reflection of the 
depicted surfaces and space” (2018: 13).  
 
Notwithstanding, it is permissible to consider levels of involvement in what 
Matthew Collings, in his TV programme of the same name, calls: “the rules 
of abstraction” (BBC Four, 2014). It is not within the scope of this short 
essay to seek to address these rules directly. Nevertheless, it is no doubt 
correct to assert that some familiarity with the myriad moves of abstraction 
– the game of painting as a whole (Bois, 1994: 241) – is required in order to 
allow the painter to work knowingly with abstraction. To be with abstract 
painting is to take on board that which painting has been, in the service of 
what it might become. It is not simply that painters help to ensure – with 
works – that paintings reference earlier modes of painting, but more that to 
engage in any process of painting – as painting – is to find oneself subsumed 
in painting’s past. 
 
American abstraction – particularly of the New York School – tends, at this 
juncture, to exemplify what it is that abstract painting in the West means. 
Big, optically significant, gestural (or not), painterly (or not), flat, minimal, 
hard-edged et al: to consider abstract painting outside of the aesthetic and 
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performative models supplied by Clement Greenberg (1960) and Harold 
Rosenberg (1952) respectively is to look again to its European origins, or 
else to ponder its situation in the aftermath of the pluralisation of 
approaches to painting that the 1970s ushered in. To wrestle with the 
viability of an abstract painting now is to engage in theoretical 
conversations to do with digitisation, the screen, appropriation, the body, 
and the historical development and oft-presumed death of painting. To 
work in the shadow of the idea of an abstract painting is to seek to retain 
something of painting: a thing that painting can still be. 
 
Moreover, with the impulse to retain comes the impulse to locate, or to find 
space for (to see how one thing rests in respect of another). To claim to sit 
between – abstract and figurative painting – would be to claim knowledge of 
that which either side (and together) serves to position the between, 
leaving that which becomes positioned to do so approximately: for if either 
of the locating pillars happen to have been built on shaky ground – or if 
there is recourse to doubt the soundness of the partitions that keep the 
between between – then subsequent deliberations will threaten the identity 
of the known. In the case of abstract and figurative painting, there are 
problematic practical, art historical and linguistic particularities to consider 
if one is to grasp the varying nuances of claims to work off, with, amid, or 
in opposition to either marker.  
 
Abstract painting has, over the past century, taken many forms. To say this, 
however, is to imply that abstraction is rooted in the structures of painted 
objects: to see it as something that modifies itself in accordance with 
internalised painterly developments. In this light, abstraction becomes 
historicised as a thing that painting has sometimes been. Only then can it 
acquire an origin, a method of approach and a sense of logic that permits it 
distinction, but also relatedness (to other modes of abstract painting, and 
to non-abstract painting too). As painting has changed, so, the logic goes, 
has abstraction. To abstract is to begin in one place and to move from—to 
remove. It is, for the most part, to orient the work away from a mode (or 
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modes) of pictorial verisimilitude—towards a something else. This something 
else, in respect of the works of the pioneers of abstraction – Mondrian, 
Kupka, Malevich, Kandinsky, Klee and the Delaunays – could, then, be said 
to look unlike the World to varying degrees.  
 
Approximation is built on looking, but also on conditioning and expectation. 
In short: to look is to cast one’s eye over; to be implicated in is to be a user 
of language; and to expect is to assume a likely effect from a presumed 
cause. If abstract paintings have looked other than like the World, they 
have not looked like any other World, and not only because painters have 
had no knowledge of other worlds – and thus cannot legitimise an 
alternative form of likeness – but also because looking like, in painting, was 
deemed superfluous to requirements. The constituents of paintings – colour, 
tonality and arrangement – were, by many painters from 1910 onwards, 
redeployed for other ends. These ends were sometimes political, oftentimes 
ideological, and always metaphysical. Thus, to paint was to establish 
material structures that would, in turn, act to invoke, or else retain, an 
immateriality too easily lost behind lifelikeness. 
 
This would manifest itself as an appeal to a host of signs and symbols rather 
than to likeness (visual approximation)—to that which, in the configuration 
of its form, pointed towards the transcendent. Yet there was an appeal to 
immanence too—to that which is present. Take, for example, the redness of 
red, which can be seen to be present in any presentation of red, whereas 
the angriness of red, for instance, is present only in a demonstration of 
red’s use within a framework to disclose anger. The Platonic implications of 
a universal rednesss that precedes a discrete moment of redness aside; the 
unlikeness of colour – the sense of it becoming liberated from things – 
permitted painters to redirect attention away from the world of seeing as a 
form of pattern alignment (this structure of paint aligns with that moment 
in the World), and towards foregrounding of painting’s presentness, and also 
its truth.  
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To operate between abstraction and figuration – as a painter – is to make 
some concession to what the World looks like, whilst, at the same time, 
doubting that the world of pictures is enough. A search begins…for more: 
more material, more ideas, more truth! But there is a contradiction: for the 
painting must maintain the idea of picturing, however attenuated, within its 
form, or else picturing dissolves in favour of what Michael Fried would later 
call objecthood (1967). To not have pictures is to be without the ability to 
have one thing represent another. To have objecthood only would be not to 
have objecthood, for objecthood functions as an imposition: applied in 
response to a consideration of pictures. To seek to throw out pictures does 
little more than reinforce their hold over all who approach paintings 
knowingly. It is in their seeming absence pictures that are most present. In 
their presence they hide. 
 
If the looking like sort of pictures – the iconic – can be suspended, to be 
replaced by symbolic representations of one sort or another, then it follows 
that the operability of pictures is not dependant on the work to which 
picturing is ascribed. In other words, resembling pictures are merely built 
into the possibility of looking at paintings. So too, it would appear, are 
symbolic alignments of this with that—paintings can be lined up against all 
manner of other things. This is significant in that it gives the lie to attempts 
to keep abstract and figurative modes of painting apart, on absolutist, non-
experiential grounds. In short: designations as to the abstractness of a 
painting appear conditioned by what it is that one hopes to get from 
painting in the first instance, by how one utilises language and history, and 
by the extent to which one is able to navigate sometimes simple/sometimes 
complex optic and haptic systems of exchange.  
 
What Ernst Gombrich termed the psychology of pictorial representation 
(1960) – how we come to see what it is that we come to see – is a complex, 
contested area of theoretical inquiry, which draws together iconological, 
cognitive and historical dimensions of looking and using images, in the 
service of supplying a model of perception that embeds painting within a 
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host of cultural particulars. Simon Bill, in writing about the neuropsychology 
of visual perception, seeks to demonstrate how, in essence, seeing and 
knowing are to be considered part of the same experience. The result being 
that a purely formal visual experience (prior to polluting it with content, as 
Clive Bell might have suggested) is, in Bill’s analysis, simply not feasible 
(2018: 16). He comes rather close to Gombrich when he reminds the reader 
of the constructedness of seeing: of its dependence on sensory receptivity 
and stored knowledge. Abstract painting is an invitation to abstract, and to 
disregard (2018: 19). 
 
And so, the more famous of the conscious in-betweeners from the mid-to-
late twentieth century – De Stael, De Kooning and Diebenkorn – attain 
degrees of in-betweenness as a result of how their paintings look, which 
relates to how other paintings have looked, and to what it was possible to 
set out to achieve in respect of the then current discourses of painting, but 
also in respect of various sensory determinates. Yes, in their paintings there 
is irresolution of one sort or another, a regularity of structure, a tendency 
to emphasise the general rather than the particular, an exaggeration of 
colour, and a seeming misuse of perspectival space. Still, all of these 
features are commonplace in the works of even the most zealous of 
figurative painters. If singular modes of practice or discrete genres have 
existed at all (by which I mean, attained concrete form in/as paintings), 
then such occurrences were surely fugitive, and requiring of a 
circumscription of exposure to countless contaminates.  
 
Abstract painting is a useful label to differentiate some of the varying 
manners of painting, but it does so with a broad brush. As a term, it points 
also to a series of preoccupations, as does the sometimes-confusing label, 
figurative. Similarly misinforming is the oft-unqualified term 
representation, which tends to be used to mean to attain likeness of the 
resembling sort. It is generally misleading to ascribe abstractness or 
figurativeness to painted objects without implying too great a separation 
between activities and objects. Abstract painting is, firstly, painting—the 
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orchestration of materials on a surface, with an intent to affect. 
Nonetheless, the affect of abstract painting is not the subject to hand. My 
intention here has been to offer a number of suggestions as to how to 
approach thinking about abstraction and painting, with the hope, perhaps, 
of shedding a little light on a rather murky area of debate.  
 
To be between abstraction and figuration is to be involved in painting. 
Involvement can be great or little, and the degree to which abstraction 
makes sense – to which it determines and is determined by events – 
determines its manner of meaningfulness. Consequently, abstraction can be 
worked with, or not (which can also amount to working with), by both 
maker and spectator alike. This appears to include making oneself receptive 
to the varying prospects of abstraction—to what it can now be. The 
intricacies of language and signs (the possibilities of picturing), the 
complexities of cognition, and the particularities of painted objects in situ 
conspire to delimit painting’s reach. Yet such limitations are themselves 
opportunities: in this instance, to explore how it is that painting is able to 
perpetually reconfigure its form against the expansive backdrop of the 
world of non-painterly reconfigurations, and to persist still. 
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